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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/07/2011 Accident number: 781 
Accident time: 10:45 Accident Date: 20/01/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/0112/0042, MF 
0340, Shirin Village, 
Surobi District, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 17/02/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 19/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File date: 17th Feb 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 26 DMINING ACCIDENT  
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Centre to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] DT- 26. The accident occurred at 
10:45 hours on 20 January 2009 at minefield number AF/0112/0042/MF 0340, located in 
Shirin village, Surobi district of Kabul province. 
SUMMARY: 
AF/0112/0042/MF 0340 is located alongside the Kabul-Jalalabad highway, near to Surobi 
Power station. The area was mined during 1981-1989 by Russian troops and their successor 
government in order to keep their convoys safe from the attacks of Mujahedeen during their 
travelling from mentioned highway. This area was surveyed by LIS under the community No- 
1201, SHA -02 and then was polygoned by LIAT during 2008. Several mine accidents 
occurred in the area on human and animals during the past years.  
[Demining group] DT-26 was tasked to start clearance operation on 21 December 2008. 
During the period of operations they cleared 17490m2 area and found/destroyed 17 AP mines 
and 738 different types of ERW.  
On 20 January 2009 while de-miner [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane excavating 
a detected signal, his bayonet stroked the top of a PMN mine and caused it to explode. 
According to the investigation report the de-miner has not maintained and considered the 
default clearance depth during the excavation and used his bayonet carelessly, therefore, 
caused the accident. Unfortunately the victim was not fully dressed with PPE and his visor 
was up during the accident. Thus he has got several injuries on his face, legs and different 
parts of his body.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
The investigation team concluded that the contributing factors to this accident were: poor 
command and control in the team and Carelessness of de-miner, as he has started operation 
directly on the top of mine and not used his PPE properly.   
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• Full PPE must be worn correctly at all times in a hazard area while the operation is 
going on.  
• The de-miners should pinpoint the signal properly, mark the point and then to start 
excavation according to the SOPs. 
• The de-miners should not hurry up during operations and be careful during 
excavation drill and do not use the bayonet forcefully. 
• The command group should strengthen their supervision during operation and stop 
the deminers from conducting drills in contrary to SOPs.  
• The team should undergo refresher training with focus on prodding and excavation 
drill plus team command and control.  
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• The IPs are recommended to timely inform the AMACs of accident occurring and do 
not disturb the accident area until arrival of internal and external investigation teams.   
Victim Report 
Victim number: 967 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES:severe Body; severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Legs 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "…injuries on his face, legs and different 
parts of his body". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was working with his visor raised (and perhaps without frontal body protection) and was 
excavating on top of the mine, but these errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is 
listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the group’s 
management should “strengthen their supervision during operation”. Failure to provide 
effective training is a further significant Management Control Inadequacy. 
The investigators do not record whether the Victim suffered eye injury, but this is considered 
highly likely and so is recorded.  
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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